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Abstract
This paper re-examines the empirical evidence on the price puzzle and proposes a
new theoretical interpretation. Using structural VARs and two di¤erent identi…cation
strategies based on zero restrictions and sign restrictions, we …nd that the positive response
of price to a monetary policy shock is historically limited to the sub-samples associated
with a weak central bank response to in‡ation. These sub-samples correspond to the
pre-Volcker period for the US and the pre-in‡ation targeting regime for the UK. Using
a micro-founded DSGE sticky price model of the US economy, we then show that the
structural VARs are capable of reproducing the price puzzle on arti…cial data only when
monetary policy is passive and hence multiple equilibria arise. In contrast, the DSGE
model never generates on impact a positive in‡ation response to a policy shock. The
omission in the VARs of a variable capturing the high persistence of expected in‡ation
under indeterminacy is found to account for the price puzzle observed on actual data.
JEL classi…cation: E30, E52.
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Structural vector autoregressions (SVARs) are widely used to measure and understand the
e¤ects of monetary policy innovations on the aggregate economy. The empirical validity of
theseassessments relies on the selection of a plausible identi…cation scheme, which requires to
imposing an appropriatenumber ofrestrictionson the relationshipsamong thevariablesofthe
empirical model. The contemporaneous zero restrictions used by Sims (1992) and popularized
by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) is, for instance, a typical identi…cation strategy
to isolate the e¤ects of a policy shock. This identi…cation hinges upon the assumption that
the policy instrument reacts contemporaneously to in‡ation and output, while in‡ation and
output respond to the policy instrument with some lags only.
Whilemost resultsintheVARliteratureareconsistent with economicintuitionandmacro-
economic theory, the typically found positive reaction on impact of the price level to a mone-
tary policy shock isa fact that most monetary models havedi¢culty explaining. Thisanomaly,
…rst noted by Sims (1992) and labelled ‘theprice puzzle’ by Eichenbaum (1992), seems to cast
serious doubt on the ability of correctly identifying a monetary policy shock. If the central
bank monitors and responds to a larger information set relative to the one of the VAR, what
is referred to as a policy shock is actually a combination of a genuine policy shock and some
endogenous policy reactions.
Sims (1992) argues that the central bank may have more information about future in-
‡ation than a simple VAR could adequately capture. The result of this omission is that a
policy tightening in anticipation offuturein‡ationwould be wrongly interpreted by the econo-
metrician as a policy shock. As long as the monetary policy response only partially o¤sets
the in‡ationary pressure, the VAR would therefore deliver a spurious correlation between a
tightening of policy and a rise of in‡ation, namely the price puzzle. Sims (1992) observes
that the inclusion of a commodity priceindex in the VAR seems to capture enough additional
information about future in‡ation as to possibly solve the puzzle.
In a recent speech as Fed Governor, Bernanke (2004) o¤ered a new interpretation of the
hypothesis of mis-identi…cation of the structural shocks conjecturing that:
“[...] changes in in‡ation expectations, which are ultimately the product of the
monetary policy regime, can alsobe confusedwithtruly exogenous shocks in conven-
tional econometric analysis. Marvin Goodfriend (1993) has suggested, for example,
that insu¢ciently anchored in‡ation expectations have led to periodic ‘in‡ation
scares’, in which in‡ation expectations have risen in an apparently autonomous
manner. Increases in in‡ation expectations have the ‡avor of adverse aggregate
supply shocks in that they tend to increase the volatility of both in‡ation and out-
put, in a combination that depends on how strongly the monetary policy makers
act to o¤set these changes in expectations.”1
Thispapero¤ers a theoretically and empirically consistent explanation for thepricepuzzle
using a micro-founded DSGE model and structural VARs. A major contribution is to show
that the price puzzle has been historically a distinctive feature of speci…c monetary policy
regimes. These regimes are the period prior to the appointment of Paul Volcker as Fed
1It should be noted thatBernanke (2004) refers to Goodfriend’s argument of ‘insu¢ciently anchored in‡ation
expectations’ in the context of the ‘Great Moderation’ de…ned as the sizable decline of output and in‡ation
variability observed moving from the 1970s and very early 1980s to the rest of the 1980s and the 1990s. In the
original paper however Goodfriend (1993) refers to the very end of the 1970s and very early 1980s only.
2Chairman in August 1979 for the US and the period prior to the introduction of the in‡ation
targeting regime in 1992 for the UK. This result is robust to using two di¤erent identi…cation
strategies based on recursive zero restrictions and sign restrictions as well as to augmenting
the VARs with unit labor costs, a commodity price index and M2. Moreover, the sub-sample
evidence on the price puzzle is found to be independent from using real GDP, detrended
output, the output gap or output growth as a measure of real activity.
A wide number of contributions to the empirical literature on monetary policy rules …nds
that a shift in theconduct of monetary policy occurred at the end of 1979 in the US (Clarida,
Galí, and Gertler, 2000, Boivin and Giannoni, 2003, Lubik and Schorfheide, 2004, Cogley and
Sargent, 2005, among others) and at the end of 1992 in the UK (Nelson, 2003). We therefore
investigate the correlation between the empirical result of this literature about monetary
policy and the empirical …nding of this paper about the price puzzle.
Using a DSGE sticky price model of the US economy as data generating process, we show
that structural VARs on arti…cial data, based on either zero restrictions or model consistent
sign restrictions, are capable of reproducing the price puzzle only when the central bank does
not raisetheinterest ratesu¢ciently in response to in‡ation and thus multiple equilibria arise.
In contrast, the DSGE model is not capable ofgenerating on impact a positiveresponseof the
price level to a monetary policy shock even when monetary policy is passive.2 Another main
contribution of the paper is to show that the price puzzle is actually a spurious correlation
induced by the omission in the VAR of a variable capturing the persistence of expected
in‡ation, which is remarkably higher under indeterminacy. And, the indeterminacy induced
omitted variable bias is found to account quantitatively for the apparently puzzling response
of in‡ation to a policy shock observed on actual data. Interestingly, our results show that the
arguments in Sims (1992) and Bernanke (2004) are supported in the context of a structural
model only when monetary policy is passive and thus multiple equilibria arise.
It is worth noticing that since the seminal paper by Sims (1992) and the comment by
Eichenbaum (1992), several important recent contributions including Hanson (2004), Gior-
dani (2004) and Leeper and Roush (2003) have advanced our knowledge on the timing and
characteristics of the price puzzle. These contributions however are mainly empirical and, to
the best of our knowledge, this paper is the …rst attempt to rationalize the price puzzle using
a structural model.3
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a re-examination of the empirical
evidenceusing, among other(augmented) speci…cations, estimated SVARs in output, in‡ation
and nominal interest rate. The following part describes the DSGE sticky price model used
for the theoretical investigation. In Section 4, the dynamic responses of the theoretical model
to a monetary policy shock are compared to the impulse responses of the structural VARs
estimated on arti…cial data. The latter are shown to be severely biased relativeto the former,
and to reproduce the sign and magnitude of the price puzzle observed over the pre-1979 sub-
2Following the literature, monetary policy is de…ned as ‘active’ (‘passive’) when the nominal interest rate is
moved more (less) than proportionally in response to movements in in‡ation.
3It should be noted that in principle the cost channel and the interaction of active …scal policy and passive
monetary policy could also contribute to the sub-sample evidence on the price puzzle. At the empirical level
however, Rabanal (2004) estimates on US aggegate data a DSGE sticky price model augmented with a cost
channel and shows that the estimated model is not capable of generating a price puzzle. Lubik (2005) tests for
indeterminacy in a DSGE sticky price model that explicitely incorporates …scal policy and cannot reject the
hypothesis thatthe interaction of monetary and…scal policy in the US prior to 1979 resulted in an indeterminate
equilibrium.
3sample only when the model is simulated under indeterminacy. The results from a hybrid
version of the DSGE model are also presented. Section 5 o¤ers a new interpretation of the
price puzzle and shows that augmenting the SVAR on actual data with the Federal Reserve’s
in‡ation forecasts reduces signi…cantly the omitted variable bias that would otherwise emerge.
Conclusions are presented in the last section. The source of the data and the construction of
the variables are detailed in the Data Appendix while the last Appendix outlines the method
in Sims (2001) and the identi…cation strategy proposed in Lubik and Schorfheide (2003 and
2004) to solve the model under indeterminacy.
2 A Re-examination of the Empirical Evidence
This section reconsiders the empirical evidence from the VAR literature and shows that the
price-puzzle is a sub-sample phenomenon. In particular, a positive response of in‡ation to
an interest rate structural innovation is an outstanding feature of the periods that, in the
empirical literature on monetary policy rules, are typically associated with a weak central
bank reaction to in‡ation. This result appears robust to several modi…cations in the VAR,
and is independent of using real GDP or the output gap as a measure of real activity.4
2.1 Identi…cation through zero restrictions
The n-variables VAR has the following structural representation
AYt =B(L)Yt¡1 +ut (1)
where Yt is the vector of endogenous variables and A is the matrix of the contemporaneous
relationships. B(L) represents the lag-structure (from lag 1 to lag p), and ut is the vector of
structural shocks, which has variance-covariance matrix E(utu0
t) = I.
The structural VAR can be written in reduced form as
Yt =C(L)Yt¡1 +vt
where theelements ofthematrices C are convolutionsoftheelements in thematrix A and the
elements in the matrices B. The reduced-form residuals are stacked in the vector vt =A¡1ut




To identify the monetary policy shock, we adopt the recursive scheme put forward by
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) and impose n(n¡1)=2 zero restrictions on the
matrix of contemporaneous relationships A. This corresponds to employing a Cholesky fac-
torization of the variance covariance matrix estimated from the unrestricted VAR such that




With a lower-triangular structure, the ordering Yt = [yt;…t;Rt]
0 implies that the measure
of real activity, yt, is the most exogenous variable, the measure of in‡ation, …t, can respond
contemporaneously to real activity only, whereas the instrument of monetary policy, Rt, can
respond contemporaneously to both in‡ation and real activity. The last equation in the struc-
tural VAR is interpreted as a contemporaneous policy rule. The model is just-identi…ed.
4As the output gap can be measured according to several statistical criteria, it is important to check the
robustness of our …ndings to di¤erent empirical de…nitions. Our results are robust to using a fairly broad range
of output gap measures which have been proposed in the literature.
42.2 Full-sample IRFs
We consider US quarterly data for the period 1966Q1-2002Q4.5 The beginning of the sample
corresponds to the date when the Federal funds rate was …rst traded consistently above the
discount rate. Theresults below arerobust to let the …rst sub-sample begin in the …rst quarter
of 1960 and the second sub-sample begin in the fourth quarter of 1982, which corresponds to
the end of Volcker’s experiment on non-borrowed reserves targeting. The …rst set of impulse
responses use real GDP as a measure of activity. The baseline measure of in‡ation is the
change in the GDP de‡ator while the policy instrument is the federal funds rate.
Figure 1 plots the impulse response functions of the three variables to a monetary policy
tightening obtained from the estimates of the recursive VAR outlined in the previous section.6
[Figure 1 about here]
The middle panel shows the price puzzle. After a monetary policy shock, the price level
moves upward such as to imply a positive and prolonged increasein in‡ation. In contrast, the
responses of the federal funds rate and the output level appear in line with the predictions of
the theory. The zeros on impact are imposed in the identi…cation.
The 95% con…dence bands of the in‡ation reaction do include the zero. The analysis
below will show, however, that the price puzzle is indeed very signi…cant over the sub-sample
associated with a weak central bank response to in‡ation. For the time being, it is worth
emphasizing not only that the qualitative pattern of in‡ation in Figure 1 is counter-intuitive
but also that many macroeconomicmodelshaveseriousdi¢culties in explaining it. Thispaper
reconciles theory and empirics using a DSGE monetary model. As the theory suggests that
the output gap rather than the level of output should be used as a measure of real activity,
the analysis below will also focus on VARs that include the output gap.
2.3 The Sub-sample Stylized Fact
This section recasts the discussion on the price puzzle in terms of monetary policy shifts
and asks whether the change in the conduct of US monetary policy that Clarida, Galí and
Gertler (2000), Boivin and Giannoni (2003), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), and Cogley and
Sargent (2005), among others, date to the end of the 1970s, is correlated with the evidence
on the price puzzle. To investigate this possibility, we follow earlier contributions and split
the sample in the third quarter of 1979 when Paul Volcker was appointed Chairman of the
FOMC and …ghting in‡ation became a clear policy objective. We use the same variables and
identi…cation scheme of the previous section and compute the IRFs from the restricted VAR
over the two sub-samples.
[Figure 2 about here]
Figure2 shows that thepricepuzzleissigni…cant and sizableduring thepre-Volcker period
only. Thereactions ofall variables to thepolicy shock appear farlargerthan in thefull-sample
analysis. In particular, the in‡ation rate peaks at 57 basis point, while in Figure 1 the peak
does not go further than 16 basis point. After seven quarters the in‡ation rate becomes
5A detailed description of the data can be found in the Data Appendix.
6The number of lags in the VARs is chosen throughout the paper according to standard lag length criteria.
The results are robust to keeping the number of lags …xed across sub-samples.
5negative implying that the price level reverses its path. Turning to the post-Volcker regime
1979Q4-2002Q4 in the bottom panel, wedo not …nd any evidenceofa price puzzle in that the
in‡ation reaction to a policy shock is negative on impact and then fades away fairly quickly,
far from being statistically relevant.7
Figures 1 and 2 are based on tri-variate SVARs embedding the real GDP. As Giordani
(2004) emphasizes however, the macroeconomic theory predicts that the output gap rather
than the level of output should enter a VAR designed for monetary policy analysis. We take
this point seriously and estimate a tri-variate VAR in the output gap, in‡ation and nominal
interest rate using the recursive identi…cation scheme outlined above. The output gap xt
is de…ned as the percentage deviation of output yt from its potential level y¤
t. In turn, we
consider three di¤erent measures of potential output that correspond to: i) the estimates of
the Congressional Budget O¢ce (CBO), ii) the HP-…lter trend, and iii) a quadratic trend.8
Figure3 depictstheimpulseresponsesofin‡ationto amonetary policy shock. TheotherIRFs,
omitted for brevity and available upon request, show patterns consistent with the theory.
[Figure 3 about here]
Immediately, we see that the presence of the output gap does not a¤ect the sub-sample
evidence. The reaction of the in‡ation rate is quite similar across di¤erent output gap de…ni-
tions, and it is also very similar to the impulse response shown in Figure 2. The evidence in
favor of the price puzzle is statistically relevant only before 1979 in spite of the fact that the
measure of real activity is now the output gap. The response of in‡ation peaks after a few
periods and it is now larger than in thefull-sample analysis reported in Figure 1. In contrast,
the price puzzle disappears after 1979. Using the growth rate of real GDP as measure of real
activity or using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) as measure of in‡ation gives results, not
reported but available upon request, which are fairly similar.
2.4 Robustness Analysis
This section investigates therobustness of our results to using a four-variateand a …ve-variate
SVAR. The expanded vector of endogenous variable is given by e Yt = [zt; yt;…t;Rt]
0 where zt
contains the additional variable(s). Figure 4 presents the in‡ation response to a monetary
policy shock under four di¤erent speci…cations of the vector e Yt. The …rst column augments
the tri-variateVAR in federal fundsrate, in‡ation and real activity witha measureofreal unit
labor costs as suggested by the theory and by the empirical analysis in Sbordone (2002). The
second column uses the changes in theProduction Price Index (PPI: Industrial Commodities)
as fourth variable of the VAR in thespirit of Sims (1992), while thethird column assesses the
ability of M2 growth to lead future in‡ation in the context of the non-recursive identi…cation
strategy proposed by Leeper and Roush (2003).9 The last column presents the results from
7Similar results are obtained by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) using a recursive identi…cation
and monthly data, and by Boivin and Giannoni (2003) using a recursive factor-augmented VAR and quarterly
data. The focus of these papers however is on measuring the monetary policy shocks and on assessing whether
monetary policy has become more e¤ective rather than on interpreting the price puzzle.
8The HP …lter is two-sided and so produces a smoothed series of output that may lead to inconsistent
estimates. Other studies however employ this cyclical measure and for the sake of comparison we also report
the IRFs using the deviations of output from an HP and a quadratic trend.
9Very similar …ndings are obtained replacing M2t growth with the level of M2t or with a measure of real
balances, M2t=Pt where Pt is the GDP de‡ator at time t. The price puzzle becomes even larger over the
6a speci…cation advocated by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) which consists of a
…ve-variate VAR in PPI in‡ation, real GDP, in‡ation, federal funds rate and M2 growth.
[Figure 4 about here]
All impulse response functions in Figure 5 reveal that the data still favor the hypothesis
that the price puzzle is limited to the pre-1979 sub-sample. As in the previous …gures, the
puzzle is quantitatively important and statistically relevant for all speci…cations, though the
estimates for the four-variate VAR with M2 growth are somewhat less precise. It is worth
emphasizing that the standard practice of including the Production Price Index to solve the
price puzzle, as shown in the second and last columns, does not overturn the sub-sample
evidence.10
2.5 An alternative identi…cation strategy based on sign restrictions
In thissection, we discuss the robustnessoftheresults based on contemporaneous zero restric-
tions to using an alternative identi…cation scheme based on sign restrictions. The technical
implementationofthisalternativestrategy is already o¤ered in several papers in theliterature
and will not be repeated here (see Peersman, 2005 and the references therein).
In line with the theoretical model used below, a monetary policy shock has a non-negative
impact ontheinterest rateanda non-positivee¤ect ontheoutput gap. It isworthemphasizing
that unlike previous contributions, which rule out thepricepuzzle by assuming a non-positive
in‡ation response to a monetary policy shock, we deliberately leave the in‡ation response
unconstrained in an e¤ort to investigate and document the sub-sample regularity associated
with the price puzzle.
The e¤ects of supply and demand shocks are consistent with a typical aggregate demand
and aggregate supply diagram: a supply (demand) disturbance has a non-negative (non-
negative) e¤ect on interest rate and in‡ation, and a non-positive (non-negative) e¤ect on the
output gap. Following Peersman (2005), the restrictions on the interest rate are imposed
over the contemporaneous reaction whereas the restrictions on the responses of in‡ation and
output are imposed for, but not limited to, the …rst four periods.
The choice of identifying also supply and demand shocks as opposed to identifying the
monetary policy shock only, while not crucial for the results, is twofold. First, we want to
make sure that following other types of shocks the matrix of contemporaneous parameters,
which also identi…es the policy shock, does not produce responses of in‡ation, output and
interest rate inconsistent with economic intuition and theory. Second, we wish to impose
most of the sign restrictions implied by a typical DSGE sticky pricemodel because this is the
vehicle used in the section 4 to show that the price puzzleis the arti…ceofan omitted variable
bias. The qualitative results are not a¤ected by varying these numbers.
[Figure 5 about here]
pre-1979 sub-sample using two alternative recursive identi…cations in which money is the most exogenous and
then the most endogenous variable in the VAR.
10Our results are robust also to using the log of PPI, the Oil Price Index of the Wall Street Journal, the
PPI: Crude Fuel, and the PPI: Crude Materials. Similar …ndings are reported in Fuhrer (2000) and extensively
commented in Hanson (2004).
7Figure 5 presents the impulse responses of the output gap, in‡ation and the interest
rate to a monetary policy shock. The price puzzle con…rms itself as an empirical regularity
associated with the pre-1979 sub-sample. Relaxing the contemporaneous zero restrictions
actually ampli…es the puzzle in that the in‡ation response becomes now positive and highly
signi…cant also on impact. Furthermore, following a policy shock in‡ation declines on impact
over the post-1979 sub-sample with monetary policy having a signi…cant e¤ect onall variables.
2.6 Evidence for the UK
The link between a monetary policy regime and the evidence on the price puzzle does not
seem limited to the US. While an international investigation is beyond the scope of this
paper, we employ a tri-variate recursive VAR using data for the UK economy before and
after the introduction of the in‡ation targeting regime in the fourth quarter of 1992. The
sample starts in 1979Q2 when the Thatcher government was …rst elected and moved towards
a more explicitly counter-in‡ationary monetary policy. Additionally, the data on the UK
labor market, including unit labor costs, began to be systematically collected and published
only in 1979 with the establishment of the Labour Force Survey.
[Figure 6 about here]
Figure 6 compares the impulse responses of in‡ation to a monetary policy shock using
real GDP, HP-…ltered and quadratically detrended output asmeasureofreal activity, and the
change in GDP de‡ator and CPI as measures of in‡ation, respectively. The policy instrument
istheBank ofEngland Repo rate.11 Thetop panel shows that only thepre-1992 estimates are
associated with a large and robust price puzzle, although this is not statistically signi…cant.
In contrast, the in‡ation targeting regime is characterized by a few dynamics and the price
puzzle is not present anymore. The positive in‡ation response, which emerges now only for a
few quarters, is quite small relative to the IRFs in the top panel.12
The hypothesis of a correlation between the price puzzle and the monetary policy regime
is consistent with theevidence in Nelson (2003) who …nds that the pre- and post-1992 periods
are characterized by a marked di¤erence in the monetary policy stance: the nominal interest
rate has been raised more than proportionally in response to in‡ation only since 1992.13
In summary, Figures 1 to 6 identify a new stylized fact. The VAR evidence of a positive
reaction of in‡ation on impact to a monetary policy shock is limited to speci…c historical
periods. These are the pre-Volcker sample for the US and the pre-in‡ation targeting regime
for the UK. The dating of this stylized fact calls for a new explanation of the price puzzle.
Our hypothesis is that most of the apparent price puzzle comes from the (mis)identi…cation
of the monetary policy shock during the regimes associated with a weak response of interest
rate to in‡ation. The rest of the paper investigates this hypothesis using a standard DSGE
sticky price model.
11Similar results are obtained using the 3-month Treasury bill rate, which has historically moved quite closely
with the di¤erent policy instruments used by the UK monetary authorities since 1979. The correlation between
the Repo rate and the 3-month Treasury bill rate is 0:97.
12Similar results are obtained by Benati and Mumtaz (2005) using sign restrictions.
13As the paper focuses on monetary policy, we abstract from …scal policy considerations which may have
also contributed to the in‡ation outcome of the 1980s in the UK.
83 A Framework for Monetary Policy Analysis
This section describes a log-linearized, microfounded New-Keynesian sticky price model of
the business cycle of the kind popularized by Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999), King (2000)
and Woodford (2003) among others. This model consists of the following three aggregate
relationships:
xt = Etxt+1 ¡¿(Rt ¡Et…t+1) +gt (2)
…t =ﬂEt…t+1 +•(xt ¡zt) (3)












where xt is de…ned as the deviation of output from a long-run trend, …t represents in‡ation,
and Rt is thenominal interest rate. In‡ation and the interest rate areexpressed in percentage
deviations from their steady state values.
Equation (2) is a log-linearized IS curve stemming from the household’s intertemporal
problem in which consumption and bond holdings are the control variables and ¿ represents
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. There is no physical capital in this economy and
therefore consumption is proportional to total resources up to an exogenous process gt. The
latter is typically interpreted as a government spending shock or a preferences shock.14
Equation (3) captures the staggered feature of a Calvo-type world in which each …rm
adjusts its price with a constant probability in any given period, and independently from
the time elapsed from the last adjustment. The discrete nature of price setting creates an
incentive to adjust prices more the higher is the future in‡ation expected at time t. The
parameter 0 < ﬂ < 1 is the agents’ discount factor while kt, which is the inverse of the
sacri…ce ratio, relates the di¤erence between the output deviation from a long-run trend, xt,
and the stochastic marginal cost of production, zt, to the contemporaneous rate of in‡ation
…t.
Equation (4) characterizes the behavior of the monetary authorities. This is an interest
rateruleaccording to which thecentral bank adjuststhepolicy rateinresponseto in‡ation and
the output gap, (xt ¡zt). These adjustments are implemented smoothly, with ‰R measuring
the degree ofinterest ratesmoothing. Therandom variable "R stands forthe monetary policy
shock, which can be interpreted either as unexpected deviations from the policy rule or as
policy mistake.
There is no correlation between innovations and their variance-covariance matrix is de-
scribed in equation (5). Furthermore, all shocks hitting the economy are white noise. The
last assumption has been deliberately designed to make transparent the e¤ect of indetermi-
nacy on the persistence of in‡ation and in‡ation expectations. Allowing for an autoregressive
process for zt does not alter our conclusions.
4 Impulse Response Functions Analysis
In this section, we investigate whether the small-scale DSGE monetary model detailed above
is capable of reproducing the price puzzle. The model is parameterized using theestimates in
14Notice that the IS curve can be easily reinterpreted as a schedule explaining the behavior of the ‘output
gap’ de…ned as the di¤erence between the stochastic components of output and the ‡exible price level of output
(see Clarida, Galí, and Gertler, 1999). In this case, the shock gt is also a function of potential output variations.
9Lubik and Schorfheide(2004). Weemploy thesamestructural VARon two data sets generated
under indeterminacy and determinacy. The procedure in the simulations is as follows:
1. Solvethe model under both indeterminacy and determinacy, and generate two data sets
of 55 and 93 observations including output gap, in‡ation and interest rate.15
2. For each solution, estimate a reduced-form tri-variate VAR on the arti…cial data and
impose the same identi…cation strategies adopted in the empirical analysis
3. Compute the responses of the variables to a structural innovations in the interest rate
equation.
4. Repeat steps (i) to (iii) 10; 000 times and for each parameterization select the median
structural IRFs.16
To the extent that indeterminacy can explain the price puzzle, the SVARs using the data
simulated under indeterminacy should reproduce, at least qualitatively, the stylized fact, and
possibly generatestructural IRFs which arewithin the empirical 95% con…dencebands shown
in Section 2. On the other hand, the SVARs using the data simulated under determinacy
should not produce any puzzling response.
4.1 Parameterization
In order to implement Step 1 and check the robustness of our results to di¤erent parameter-
izations, we use two sets of estimates for the New-Keynesian model presented in Section 3.
These values are reported in Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) forthe US economy over some pre-
and post-Volcker samples. The only di¤erence relative to their model is that our speci…ca-
tion deliberately lacks any endogenous or exogenous persistence in the in‡ation and output
process. This choice re‡ects the attempt to evaluate the ability of a quite forward-looking
model to generate persistence under indeterminacy.
To focuson theimportance of a change in monetary policy, we keep all structural parame-
ters of the model …xed across simulations with the exception of the coe¢cients in the interest
rate equation. The …rst (second) arti…cial data set corresponds to the pre-1979 (post-1979)
estimates ofthereaction function. In doing so, any di¤erencein thestructural IRFs estimated
on the arti…cial data sets can only be due to the variation in the Taylor rule. Table 1 reports
the values of the parameters of the model.17
[Table 1 about here]
It is worth noting that the interest rate response to in‡ation in the second and third
columns does not guarantee a unique RE equilibrium because both ˆ… =0:77 and ˆ… =0:89
violates the Taylor principle. Hence, theparameters in these columns generate indeterminacy
while the parameters in the last column do not.
15The number of observations has been chosen to match the quarterly data points available from 1966Q1
to 1979Q3 and from 1979Q4 to 2002Q4, respectively. In each simulated sample, 100 extra-observations are
produced to provide us with a stochastic vector of initial conditions, and then are discarded.
16Similar results are obtained employing the mean.
17Notice that we impose the values obtained by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) for the matrix f M. The same
exercise performed with the f M matrix computed as suggested by the least-square criterion presented in the
appendix does not lead to any qualitative change.
104.2 The DSGE Model-consistent IRFs and the SVARs
This section compares two di¤erent sets of IRFs following a monetary policy shock of the
samemagnitude. The …rst set represents theDSGE model-consistent reactions, which are the
impulse responses computed by solving the system (2) to (5). The second group of impulse
responsesare generated using Steps 1 to 4 ofthealgorithm above, and therefore correspond to
the estimates of the structural SVARs on the arti…cial series of the output gap, in‡ation and
nominal interest rate generated by the model under indeterminacy and under determinacy.
The magnitude of the policy shock is, in both sets of IRFs, a one-standard-deviation of the
structural shock estimated using the SVAR on the arti…cial data.
[Figure 7 about here]
The results under indeterminacy using the parameterization labelled ‘Prior 1’ in Table 1
are shown in the …rst row of Figure 7. Solid lines represent the model-consistent IRFs while
dotted lines standfor the IRFs oftheSVAR on arti…cial data. Several interesting results arise.
First, the model consistent in‡ation reaction to the policy shock is negative on impact. After
a few quarters, this reaction becomes positive and reaches a peak at 24 basis point before
converging smoothly to the initial level. Not surprisingly, we obtain an in‡ation response
which is very similar to the response estimated by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004).
TheDSGE model is not ableofproducing a price puzzle, though it isable to account under
indeterminacy fortheinertia ofin‡ationfollowinga monetary policy shock. Thissuggeststhat
the resultsin Estrella and Fuhrer (2002), who …nd that purely forward-looking models arenot
capable of reproducing the persistent and hump-shaped responses to a monetary policy shock
observed in empirical VARs, may be attributed, at least for in‡ation, to limiting implicitly
the solution of the model to the determinacy region.
The in‡ation reaction from the recursive VAR on arti…cial data begins at zero by con-
struction, depicts a quite steep curve that reaches its peak at about 50 basis points after a
few quarters and then starts to convergetowards thesteady state. After 15 quarters only, the
behavior of the two responses is virtually indistinguishable. The VAR evidence is therefore
qualitatively in line with the predictions of the model-consistent IRFs but it shows a sizable,
though gradually declining, upward bias.
The reaction of the federal funds rate to a policy shock is reported in the third column.
The estimated interest rate response from the SVAR on simulated data is shifted outward
relative to the response implied by the DSGE model. This is likely to re‡ect the fact that,
because of the in‡ation IRF bias, the systematic component of monetary policy responds to
a higher level of in‡ation in the recursive VAR on simulated data. In contrast, the response
of the output gap is fairly in line with the structural model with the only exception, by
construction, of the zero contemporaneous restriction imposed in the SVAR. Indeterminacy
in this model thus mostly in‡uences the persistence of in‡ation and theinterest rate, whereas
it does not seem to in‡uence much the persistence of the output gap response (see also Lubik
and Schorfheide, 2003).
The solution of the model under determinacy returns two sets of IRFs that are virtually
indistinguishable. The New Keynesian model suggests that following a policy rate shock
the price level initially decreases 70 basis points. After a few periods below zero, however,
in‡ation returnsto itssteady state valuere‡ecting thelack of endogenousin‡ation persistence
in the model. The response of output gap and in‡ation in the estimated VAR are di¤erent,
11by construction, in the contemporaneous period only while the response of the policy rate
e¤ectively tracks the model-consistent IRF at all periods.
[Figure 8 about here]
Figure 8 presents the results using the parameterization labelled ‘Prior 2’ in Table 1. In
general, the responses of all variables to a monetary policy shock bear out qualitatively the
responses in Figure 7. The in‡ation reaction under indeterminacy displayed in the middle
panel of the …rst row shows however an important quantitative di¤erence. The gap between
the model-consistent prediction and the response from the recursive VAR is far larger than
the gap obtained using the previous parameterization. In particular, the maximum in‡ation
di¤erential is about 40 basis points as opposed to the 16 basis points under Prior 1. Further-
more, the gap begins to shrink after a few quarters but it does not disappear, even after 20
periods. A similar result emerges about the policy rate response shown in the last column.
The distance between the two lines is clearly larger under Prior 2. In contrast, the output
gap reacts similarly under the two parameterizations.
When monetary policy is active and therefore the solution of the LRE model is unique,
the responses in the second row of Figure 8 are virtually identical to the responses in the
second row of Figure 7. This suggests that two alternative parameterizations, as those used
in this paper, do not return any notable distinction as long as the expectations of in‡ation
and output gap are well anchored by an active monetary policy. In contrast, di¤erent values
of the structural parameters may play a quantitatively important role when monetary policy
does not raise the nominal interest rate su¢ciently in responseto a risein in‡ation and hence
induces indeterminacy.
[Figure 9 about here]
The…rst and secondrow ofFigure9 areobtained using thesignrestrictionsdescribed above
and the data simulated by the sticky price model under indeterminacy and determinacy. In
line with the results from the recursive identi…cation, the price puzzle emerges in Panel A
only when monetary policy is passive. Furthermore, the in‡ation response in the …rst row
revealsthat relaxingthecontemporaneous zero restrictionsactually ampli…esthe‘pricepuzzle’
with respect to Figure 8. This evidence corroborates the view that the bias of the structural
VARs, relative to the model, is not due to the identi…cation strategy. Under determinacy,
which corresponds to a case where the VAR is correctly speci…ed and thus the policy shock is
correctly identi…ed, the IRFs of the VAR based on sign restrictions track quite closely those
of the DSGE model and the price puzzle does not materialize.
The result that using structural VARs when the data are drawn from the indeterminacy
region introduces a bias on impact in the in‡ation response to a policy shock is, to the best
of our knowledge, new in the literature. This …nding suggests that under indeterminacy a
structural VAR in output, in‡ation and interest rate is insu¢cient to capture the dynamics
of the underlying economy. In particular, the estimated positive reaction on impact appears
spurious and possibly due to a speci…cation error of the kind Bernanke (2004) conjectured in
the passage of his speech reported in the Introduction. We postpone the discussion of the
indeterminacy induced omitted variable bias to Section 6.
124.3 Replicating the Price Puzzle
The DSGE model is never capable of generating a price puzzle. In contrast, the recursive
VAR on the simulated series is, under both parameterizations, capable of generating a sizable
positive response of in‡ation on impact.
[Figure 10 about here]
The middle panel of Figure 10 brings together the in‡ation responses to a monetary pol-
icy shock estimated on actual and simulated data. All estimates are based on a recursive
tri-variate VAR in output gap, in‡ation and interest rate. Dotted lines represent 95% con…-
dence interval of the VAR estimated on actual data in Figure 3 and they are reported here
for expositional convenience. Stars (circles) represent the prediction of the SVAR on data
simulated under Prior 1 (Prior 2). The two impulse responses computed on the simulated
data e¤ectively track the response estimated on actual data and furthermore they fall within
the 95% bands at all periods. Moreover, the IRFs obtained using arti…cial data reproduce
the peak in the third quarter observed in the estimates on actual data. The simulations de-
liver a more persistent path for the in‡ation response, albeit the di¤erence is not implausible,
especially taking sampling uncertainty into account.
A similar picture emerges from the policy rate reactions in the right panel. The SVARs
using data generated from the DSGE model (2)-(5) produce responses that for magnitude
and persistence are consistent with the results on actual data. The left panel shows however
that the model is less successful in reproducing the persistence of the output response. Next
section explores whether habit formation can explain this di¤erence.18
4.4 Habit Formation
This section performs an important robustness check by introducing habit formation in the
speci…cation of the aggregate demand. This modi…cation serves two purposes. The …rst
purpose is to explore whether the results in the previous section may be overturned when
an additional source of persistence is added to the model. The second goal is to investigate
whether a richer speci…cation can improve upon the model (2)-(5) in terms of the persistence
of the output response to a policy shock.
Several recent contributions suggest that theaggregate demand relation may bebetter de-
scribedasa convex combinationoffuturerealizations and past observationsoftheoutput gap.
Söderlind, Söderström, and Vredin (2005) …nd that to …t the US facts, the New-Keynesian
model needs a large forward-looking component in the determination of output. In con-
trast, the results in Estrella and Fuhrer (2002) and Rudebusch and Fuhrer (2004) suggest the
backward-looking term is dominant. Further evidence is provided in Lubik and Schorfheide
(2004) and Ireland (2005) who estimate a New Keynesian model with habit formation and
18A comparison of the second row of Figure 7 and 8 with the second row of Figure 3 reveals that over the …rst
three quarters the baseline model solved under determinacy is less successful in replicating the empirical IRF
of output gap, in‡ation and interest rate estimated over the post-1979 sample. Interestingly, we notice that the
SVAR on data simulated under determinacy produces IRFs that always fall in the empirical 95% con…dence
intervals only when the data generating process is characterized by persistent shocks to the IS equation. This
observation calls for a deeper investigation of the relative contribution of endogenous and exogenous persistence
to the aggregate ‡uctuations in the post-1979 US economy. We leave this topic for future research.
13price indexation and …nd a signi…cant role for the former but none for the latter. In order to
capture the suggestions from these contributions, we modify the IS curve as follows:
xt =!xEtxt+1 +(1 ¡!x)xt¡1 ¡¿(Rt ¡Et…t+1) +gt (6)
and repeat the algorithm in Section 5 using the parameters in Table 2 and the model (3)-
(5),(6).
[Table 2 about here]
The parameter !x is set to 0:50, which broadly falls in the range of estimates reported in
the contributions quoted above. The results are presented in Figure 11.
[Figure 11 about here]
The output gap response now shows a higher persistence relative to the IRF in Figure 11.
In particular, it returns to its equilibrium value after 10 quarters, as opposed to 3 quarters
in the purely forward-looking speci…cation. Habit formation does not seem to improve sig-
ni…cantly the statistical …t of the impulse response on output from the simulated VAR, and
most importantly does not overturn the results on the in‡ation and interest rate responses.
Furthermore, the latter IRFs easily fall within the empirical 95% con…dence bands for most
quarters.
5 Interpreting the Sub-Sample Stylized Fact
This section explores the source of the bias in the SVARs and assesses the extent to which
misspeci…cation can account for the price puzzle observed during thepassivemonetary policy
regimes. Given that our simulations produce very similar results setting sunspot ‡uctuations
to zero at all times, the hypothesis that this type of shock be responsible for the price puzzle
is discarded from the set of candidate explanations.
5.1 The Role of the Omitted Variable in the SVAR
In the simplercasewherethecentral bank doesnot smooth thenominal interest rate(‰R =0),
the three equation New-Keynesian model can be solved analytically. Under determinacy the
dynamics oftheeconomy only depend on fundamentalsandit is possibleto re-writetheoutput
gap, in‡ation and interest rate equations as a function of the structural shocks only. Under
indeterminacy, in contrast, the transmission of structural shocks is altered and the system
is augmented with a latent variable which is not present in the unique rational expectations
equilibrium. In particular, Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) show that when monetary policy is
















where w1;t¡1 is a latent variable that follows the AR(1) process:
w1;t =‚1w1;t¡1 +qt
14The parameter ‚1 is the stable eigenvalue of ¡¤
1 of the system (2)-(5), the innovation qt is a
combination of structural and sunspot shocks while ©IND and ¨are matrices of convolutions
of the structural parameters of the model.
This simple example discloses two important insights. First, a tri-variate VAR in output
gap, in‡ation and nominal interest rateis misspeci…ed when thedata are generated according
to a New-Keynesianmodel and themonetary policy ruleviolatestheTaylor Principle. Second,
the source of mis-speci…cation is the omission of a latent variable. While it is not possible
to derive an explicit mapping between the series of w1;t¡1 and each variable in the system,
we notice that under indeterminacy expected in‡ation is highly persistent and appears to
capture a sizable part of the additional dynamics generated by the passive monetary policy.19
This observation suggests that a structural VAR that properly accounts for expected in‡ation
could reduce, at least in principle, the price puzzle bias.
[Figure 12 about here]
Figure 12 plots the response of the output gap, in‡ation and interest rate from the aug-
mented four-variate recursive VAR where expected in‡ation is ordered …rst in the vector of
series ~ Yt = [Et…t+1; yt; …t; Rt]
0 generated from the baseline New-Keynesian model. The IRFs
are shown for the indeterminacy solution as the latent variable is present in this case only.
The results, albeit robust to both parameterizations, are reported using Prior 2 where the
bias is quantitatively larger and therefore the scope for an omitted variable explanation is
more challenging. For the sake of comparison, the corresponding impulse response functions
from the tri-variate VAR in Figure 8 are reproduced as dotted lines. The IRFs using the
augmented four-variate VAR are displayed as pentagrams. The pentagrams track the IRFs
of the structural model (solid lines) remarkably well and the price puzzle bias appears simply
to vanish. Furthermore, a comparison with the dotted lines from the tri-variate VAR reveals
that controlling for expected in‡ation accounts for virtually all the omitted latent variable
bias that is behind the price puzzle detected by the structural VARs.20
This …nding quali…es and extends Sims’ conjecture about the mis-identi…cation of the
policy shock in a mis-speci…ed VAR. In particular, expected in‡ation matters not only for
their ability to predict future in‡ation but also, more importantly, for their ability to mimic
the latent variable that arises under indeterminacy only. Our results therefore also provide a
rationale for the …nding in Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz (2005) that the inclusion of a latent
factor(ordered…rst) in an otherwisestandard three-variaterecursive VARcan sensibly reduce
the price puzzle over the full postwar sample. A similar result can be found in Kozicki and
Tinsley (2003) using a time-varying model.
19The solution of a linear rational expectations model requires that all unstable roots of the system be
suppressed. The New-Keynesian model used in this paper is characterized by two roots. When monetary
policy conforms to the Taylor Principle the two roots are unstable, i.e. the system is determinate, and the
solution generates no ‘extra’ persistence relative to the speci…cation of the model. In contrast, indeterminacy is
characterized by only one unstable root, thereby implying that the solution now generates additional dynamics
through the stable root.
20The residual discrepancy between the IRFs of the four-variate SVAR and the IRFs of the DSGE model in
Figure 13, while negligible relative to the case without in‡ation expectations (dotted line), is likely due to other
factors we do not control for. These factors include the contemporaneous zero restrictions and the omission
of the output gap expectations in the SVAR. The result in Figure 13 however suggests that these alternative
explanations are likely to play only a minor role.
155.2 Assessing the Impact of the Federal Reserve’s In‡ation Forecasts
The previous results pose an important empirical question: ‘what macroeconomic series can
approximate in practice thelatent variableinduced by a passivemonetary policy?’. TheNew-
Keynesian model used in this paper suggests that the latent variable is indeed a product of
the passive monetary policy regime. Equation (7) reveals that whenever the latent variable is
omittedfromtheVAR, theidenti…cation ofthestructural shocksisinvalid inthat, forinstance,
the innovations to the interest rate equation are not anymore truly exogenous; rather they
are a convolution of the monetary policy shock and a speci…cation error.
And, by neglecting this misspeci…cation, theincorrectly identi…ed policy shock has indeed,
in Bernanke’s words, the ‡avor of an adverse supply shock in that, as shown in Figures 7 and
8, it moves in‡ation and output in opposite directions. Under determinacy, in contrast, the
monetary policy shock is correctly identi…ed and, in line with the theory, it causes in‡ation
and output to move in the same direction. Furthermore, the inclusion of expected in‡ation in
the model-based SVAR in Figure 12 appears to account for most of the omitted variable bias
in the responses of in‡ation and interest rate.
This evidence suggests a simple empirical test on the ability of expected in‡ation to ap-
proximate the theoretical latent variable. This test consists in using the Federal Reserve’s
information on future in‡ation in the SVAR on actual data. This information is contained in
the ‘Greenbook’, an extensiveand detailed analysis of the US and world economy prepared by
the Fed sta¤ before each meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee. The forecastsfrom
the Greenbook are published with a …ve years lag. Were the Federal Reserve’s expectations
on future in‡ation quantitatively important, we should observe a signi…cant reduction of the
price puzzle on actual data.
To explore this hypothesis, we then run two four-variate structural VARs on actual data
using thetwo identi…cation strategies based on thecontemporaneous zero restrictions and the
sign restrictions employed in the empirical section. For the recursive (lower-triangular) iden-






t+1 represents the one-quarter ahead in‡ation forecasts from the Greenbook.21 We
focus on this timeseriesbecauseone-quarterahead isthe relevant horizon to forecast in‡ation
in the New-Keynesian model used in this paper.22
It is worth emphasizing that we are interested in isolating the e¤ect of a monetary policy
shock, and thususing thein‡ation predictionsfromtheBoardofGovernors islikely toimprove
the identi…cation of the systematic component of monetary policy. The Greenbook forecasts
presumably include information from a wide range of sources including the policy makers’
judgement. To the extent that the forecasts produced by commercial agencies are less broad
21In estimating the SVAR we are implicitely assuming that the identi…ed policy shock is contemporaneously
uncorrelated withthe Greenbook forecasts. Onthe basisofan extensive VAR literature however, we also impose
that in‡ation and real activity respond to changes in policy with some lags only. Moreover, the results from
our SVAR are robust to using the current-quarter and the two-quarter ahead Greenbook forecasts. Altogether,
this suggest that our estimates should not su¤er an endogeneity problem. Lastly, we obtain very similar results
imposing the additional restriction that the interest rate responds contemporaneously to either the Greenbook
forecasts or to current in‡ation.
22Sample-availability is another reason for focusing on the one-quarter ahead in‡ation forecasts. In fact,
this series begins in 1968Q3, and it is among the longest available predictions. Our results are robust to using
both the two-quarter ahead in‡ation forecasts, which begin in 1968Q4, and the current-quarter forecasts, which
begin in 1967Q4. By contrast, the series of the one-year ahead in‡ation expectations is available since 1974Q2,
which limits considerably the case for a reliable sub-sample investigation.
16in scope and sources, using alternativeforecasts could lead us to mis-measuring the monetary
policy shock in the structural VAR.23
[Figure 13 about here]
Figure13 plotstheresults overthesub-sample1968Q3-1979Q3. Theleft panel refersto the
estimates based on zero restrictions while the right panel corresponds to the sign restrictions
identi…cation strategy. The solid lines with squares represent theestimated in‡ation response
from the SVARs augmented with the Greenbook expected in‡ation. The dash-dotted lines
represent the 5th and 95th percentiles of the relative distributions. We are interested in
comparing the performanceoftheaugmented SVAR relative to thesolid line, whichrepresents
the IRF from the tri-variate SVAR on actual data using output gap, in‡ation and interest
rate only.
Two results stand out. First, as suggested by the indeterminacy induced omitted variable
bias hypothesis, the ‘incorrectly identi…ed’ policy shock from the tri-variate SVAR produces
an in‡ation response (solid line) that over the …rst nine quarters is signi…cantly above the
IRF from the ‘correctly identi…ed’ four-variate augmented SVARs (solid line with squares).
Second, while the zero is inside the lower and upper percentiles overthe very …rst periods, the
identi…cation based on sign restrictions, which does not impose any zero on impact, delivers
now a negative point estimateforthe contemporaneous responseofin‡ation as opposed to the
positive 1:2 response estimated under the tri-variate SVAR in Figure 5. This suggests that
expected in‡ation are indeed empirically important in this sub-sample, and that such result
is robust to two di¤erent identi…cation strategies.
Interestingly, addingexpectedin‡ationtotheSVARestimated overthesub-sample1979Q4-
1999Q4 producesIRFs, not reported and available upon request, that are virtually identical to
the IRFs from the estimated tri-variate SVAR in output gap, in‡ation and federal funds rate
only. Wethus conclude that only when monetary policy is passive and therefore expectations
are not well-anchored, in‡ation expectations are very informative about the dynamics of the
economy. In particular, expected in‡ation are helpful to correctly identify a monetary policy
shock.
6 Conclusions
The contribution ofthis paper istwofold. At theempirical level, it shows that the pricepuzzle
is a sub-sample regularity of the periods that, in the empirical literature on monetary policy
rules, are typically associated with a weak central bank response to in‡ation. These are the
years prior to the appointment of Paul Volcker as Fed Chairman in August 1979 for the US
and the period prior to the introduction of the in‡ation targeting regime in October 1992
for the UK. The …nding is robust to augmenting the VAR with unit labor costs, commodity
price index and M2. The VAR evidence presented in this paper is new because it is obtained
using two di¤erent identi…cation strategies based on zero restrictionsand sign restrictions, and
because it is shown to hold independently from the measure of real activity and the measure
of in‡ation used.
23Romer and Romer (2000) argue convincingly that the Greenbook forecasts do have a superior historical
performance in forecasting in‡ation relative to the private sector forecasts.
17At the theoretical level, this paper employs a popular DSGE sticky price model of the US
economy to investigate whether indeterminacy, as induced by a passive monetary policy, can
account quantitatively for the price puzzle observed during the pre-1979 period. Although
previous research has proposed a numberofhelpful strategies to control forthis priceanomaly
in the data, this paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the …rst theoretically and empirically
consistent attempt to rationalize the price puzzle using a structural model.
On the basis of montecarlo simulations, we argue that the price puzzle in the SVARs is
spurious because neither under determinacy nor under indeterminacy the theoretical model
produces on impact a positive in‡ation response to a monetary policy shock. Furthermore,
we show that the price puzzle is due to the omission of a latent variable capturing the ‘extra’
dynamics that characterize the DSGE model under indeterminacy only. Expected in‡ation
arefound to approximate this omitted latent variablereasonably well, both in thetheory and
in the data. Our results thus formally support Bernanke (2004) conjecture that in speci…c
historical periods changes in in‡ation expectations areessential foridentifying truly structural
shocks.
The DSGE New-Keynesian model used in this paper, whilewidely employed for monetary
policy analysis, is highly stylized. Indeed, the link between the degree of activism in the
policy rule and multiple equilibria may be far more complex than a simple three equation
system could capture. An interesting avenue for future research would be to investigate the
empirical relevance of equilibrium indeterminacy using larger models of the business cycle
where monetary aggregates and the exchange rate are also fully speci…ed. It may well be the
case that the explanation proposed in this paper could also account for other long-standing
puzzles in macroeconomics.
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20Data appendix
Thedata fortheUS havebeencollected in March 2004 from thewebsiteoftheFederal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis. The data for the UKhavebeen collected in November2004 from the Bank
of England. The in‡ation rate, …t, is the quarter-to-quarter annualized growth rate of the
price index. Theoutput gap, xt is computed as eitherthe di¤erence between Potential output
and RGDP or as a …ltered RGDP. The two …lter used are the …lter proposed by Hodrick and
Prescott and a quadratic trend. Monthly series are transformed in quarterly series by taking
end-of-quarter observations. Log levels of all variables (except the policy rates, the output
gap measures, and the in‡ation rates) are used in the estimations.
US data
GDP De‡ator: Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price De‡ator. Seasonally adjusted. Index
2000=100. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
CPI: Consumer Price Index For All Urban Consumers: All Items. Seasonally adjusted.
Index 1996=100. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
PPI: Production Price Index: Industrial Commodities. Index 2000=100. Seasonally ad-
justed. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
PPI: Production Price Index: Crude Fuel. Index 1982=100. Seasonally adjusted. Source:
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
PPI: Production Price Index: Crude Materials. Index 1982=1000. Seasonally adjusted.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
OILPRICE: Spot Oil Price: West Texas Intermediate. Seasonally adjusted. Source: Wall
Street Journal / Haver Analytics.
Greenbook Expected In‡ation: Greenbook forecasts (1 and 2 quarters ahead) for the
GNP/GDP price level, quarter-by-quarter growth rate, annualized. Source: Federal Reserve
Board of Governors.
ULC: Nonfarm Business sector unit labor costs. Seasonally adjusted. Index 1992=100.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Potential Output: Congressional Budget O¢ce estimate. Chained 2000 $. Source: CBO.
RGDP: Real Gross Domestic Products, 3 Decimal. Chained 2000 $. Source: Bureau of
Economic Analysis.
FFR: E¤ective Federal Funds Rate. Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System H.15
M2: M2 Money Stock. Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System H.3
UK data
GDP De‡ator: Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price De‡ator. Seasonally adjusted. Index
2001=100. Source: O¢ce for National Statistics.
CPI: Consumer Price Index: All Items. Seasonally adjusted. Index 1996=100. Source:
O¢ce for National Statistics.
ULC: Business sector unit labor costs. Computed as whole economy unit labor costs
excluding government sector and including government procurements from theprivate sector.
Seasonally adjusted. Index 2001=100. Source: Bank of England calculations on ONS series.
RGDP: Real Gross Domestic Products. Chained 2001 £. Source: O¢ce for National
Statistics.
Policy rate: Bank’s Repo Rate. Source: Bank of England.
21Appendix: Solution of the Canonical LRE Model
The linear rational expectations model described by equations (2) to (5) can be cast in the
following canonical form:
¡0(￿)st =¡1(￿)st¡1 +ª(￿)"t +¦(￿)·t (8)
where the vector st = [xt; …t; Rt; Etxt+1;Et…t+1]0 collects the n variables of the system, "t =
["R;t;gt; ut]0 is the vector of l fundamental shocks, ·t =[(xt ¡Et¡1xt);(…t ¡Et¡1…t)]0 collects
the k rational expectations forecast errors, and ￿ = [ˆ…; ˆx;‰R;ﬂ; ;•;¿; ￿R;￿g; ￿u] is the
vector of the parameters of the model outlined in the previous section.
In order to transform the canonical form and solve the model, we follow Sims (2001) and
exploit the generalized complex Schur decomposition (QZ) of the matrices ¡0 and ¡1. This
corresponds to computing the matrices Q, Z, ¤ and ¢ such that QQ0 = ZZ0 =In, ¤ and ¢
are upper triangular, ¡0 = Q0¤Z and ¡1 = Q0¢Z. De…ning wt = Z0st and pre-multiplying






















where, without loss ofgenerality, the vectorofgeneralized eigenvalues ‚, which isthe vectorof
the ratios between thediagonal elements of ¢ and ¤, has been partitioned such that the lower
block collects all the explosive eigenvalues. The matrices ¢, ¤ and Q have been partitioned
accordingly, and therefore Qj: collectsthe blocks ofrows that correspond to the stable(j =1)
and unstable (j =2) eigenvalues respectively.
The explosive block of (9) can be rewritten as:24
w2;t =¤¡1
22 ¢22w2;t¡1 +¤¡1
22 Q2:(ª"t +¦·t) (10)
Given the set of m equations (10), a non-explosive solution ofthe linear rational expectations
model (8) forst requires w2;t =0 8t ¸0: Thiscanbeobtainedby settingw2;0 =0 and choosing
for every vector "t the endogenous forecast error ·t that satis…es the following condition
Q2:(ª"t +¦·t) =0 (11)
A general stablesolution fortheendogenous forecast error can becomputedthrough a singular

















, where D11 is a diagonal matrix
and D and U are orthonormal matrices. Using this decomposition, Lubik and Schorfheide




11 U:1Q2:ª+V:2f M)"t +V:2‡t (12)
where f M is the (k ¡r)xl matrix governing the in‡uence of the sunspot shock on the model
dynamics.
24It is possible to have some zero-elements on the main diagonal of ¤22. In this case, the latter matrix is
not invertible. The ’solving-forward’ solution proposed by Sims (2001) and extended by Lubik and Schorfheide
(2003) overcomes this problem. A Technical Appendix with a more detailed discussion of the solution strategy
is available from the authors upon request.
22Assuming that ¡¡1
0 exists, thesolution (12) can becombined with (8) to yield thefollowing









where a generic X¤ =¡¡1
0 X.
In general, we can be confronted with three cases. If the number of endogenous forecast
errors k is equal to the number of nonzero singular values r, the system is determined and
the stability condition (11) uniquely determines ·t. In such a case, V:2 = 0; then the last two
addends of (13) drop out. This implies that the dynamics of st is purely a function of the
structural parameters ￿.
If the number of endogenous forecast errors k exceeds the number of nonzero singular val-
ues r, the system is indeterminate and sunspot ‡uctuations can arise. Lubik and Schorfheide
(2003) show that this can in‡uence thesolution along two dimensions. First, sunspot ‡uctua-
tions ‡t can a¤ect the equilibrium dynamics. Second, the transmission offundamental shocks
"t is no longer uniquely identi…ed as the elements of f M are not pinned down by the structure
of the linear rational expectations model.
Alternatively, the number of endogenous forecast errors k can besmaller than the number
of nonzero singular values r, and then the system has no solutions. These three conditions
generalize the procedure in Blanchard and Kahn (1980) of counting the number of unstable
roots and predetermined variables.25
In order to compute f M and then the solutions of the model under indeterminacy, it is
necessary to impose some additional restrictions on theendogenous forecast errors. Following
Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), we choose f M such that the impulse responses @st
@"0
t associated
with the system (13) are continuous at the boundary between the determinacy and the inde-
terminacy region. This solution is labelled ‘continuity’.26
Let £I and £D be the sets of all possible vectors of parameters ￿0s in the indeterminacy
and determinacy region respectively. For every vector ￿ 2 £I we identify a corresponding
vector
s
￿ 2 £D that lies on the boundary of the two regions and choose f M such that the
response of st to "t conditional on ￿ mimics the response conditional on
s
￿. This corresponds




(￿) = B1(￿) +B2(￿) = ª¤ ¡¦¤V:1D¡1
11 U0
:1Q2:ª+¦¤V:2f M (14)




(e ￿) =B1(e ￿) (15)











25The solution method proposed by Sims (2001) has the advantage that it does not require the separation of
predetermined variables from ’jump’ variables. Rather, it recognizes that in equilibrium models expectational
residuals are attached to equations and that the structure of the coe¢cient matrices in the canonical form
implicitly selects the linear combination of variables that needs to be predetermined for a solution to exist.
26Alternatively, the solution of the model under indeterminacy can be computed using the assumption that
the e¤ects of the sunspot shocks are orthogonal to the e¤ects of the structural shocks. This identi…cation yields
results, not reported but available upon request, that are qualitatively similar to the …ndings for the continuity
case.
23and use (16) to calculate the solution of the model in (12) and (13).27
The new vector
s
￿ is obtained from ￿ by replacing ˆ… with the condition that marks
the boundary between the determinacy and indeterminacy region in the system (2) to (4).






27Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) notice that this way of computing the vector f M relates to the search for
the minimal-state-variable solution advocated by McCallum (1983), i.e. the most meaningful solution from an
economic perspective among the n-possible ones under indeterminacy.
24  25
 













π ψ   0.77 0.89  2.19 
x ψ   0.17 0.15  0.30 
R ρ   0.60 0.53  0.84 
β   0.99 0.99  0.99 
     Prior 1 / Prior 2 
κ   0.77 0.75  0.77 / 0.75 
1 − τ   1.45 2.08  1.45 / 2.08 
R σ   0.23 0.24  0.23 / 0.24 
g σ   0.27 0.21  0.27 / 0.21 
u σ   1.13 1.16  1.13 / 1.16 
ζ σ   0.20 0.23  - 
  Note: The parameterization of the data generating process is borrowed from Lubik and 
Schorfheide (2004), Table 3. Prior 1 (2) corresponds to the set of estimated values they 
obtain under their first (second) Prior. The indeterminacy solution uses the estimates of 
the M matrix in Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), i.e. [MRζ  Mgζ  Muζ] = [-0.68 1.74 –0.69].   26
 








π ψ   0.99 
x ψ   0.10 
R ρ   0.59 
β   0.99 
κ   0.66 
1 − τ   1.58 
x ω   0.50 
R σ   0.26 
g σ   0.18 
u σ   1.29 








Note: The parameterization of the data 
generating process is borrowed from 
Lubik and Schorfheide (2004). The 
estimates of the M matrix are as in Lubik 
and Schorfheide (2004), i.e. [MRζ  Mgζ  Muζ] 
= [-0.68 1.74 –0.69]. 
   27
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Response of FFR to a MP Shock
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2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Response of FFR to a MP Shock
 
Note: Tri-variate VAR in Real GDP, GDP deflator inflation, and federal funds rate. Identification 
achieved through a Cholesky (lower triangular) factorization of the variance-covariance matrix. Solid lines 
are point estimates, dotted lines are 95% confidence bands (analytical). Number of lags selected 
according to standard statistical lag-length criteria.   28
 
Figure 3. GDP Deflator Inflation Reaction to a Monetary Policy Shock:  
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Response of GDP DEFL. INFLATION to a MP shock
 
Note: Tri-variate VAR in a business-cycle measure, GDP deflator inflation, and federal funds rate. The 
business cycle measures are, left to right: CBO-based output gap, HP-filtered output gap and quadratically 
detrended output gap. Identification achieved through a Cholesky (lower triangular) factorization of the 
variance-covariance matrix. Solid lines are point estimates, dotted lines are 95% confidence bands 
(analytical). Number of lags selected according to standard statistical lag-length criteria.   29
Figure 4. GDP Deflator Inflation Reaction to a Monetary Policy Shock:  
Robustness Analysis with an Expanded Vector of Endogenous Variables  
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Response of GDP DEFL. INFLATION to a MP shock
 
Note: Augmented VARs using ‘additional variable/s’, CBO-based output gap, GDP deflator inflation, and federal funds rate. The ‘additional variable/s’ 
are: real unit labor costs in the first column, PPI in the second column, M2 in the third column, and both M2 and PPI in the fourth column (all in logs, 
multiplied by 100). The Structural VARs in the first two and last columns use a recursive identification schemes whereas the third column employs the 
ordering [∆M2t xt πt it]’ with the following zero restrictions on A=[α11 α12 0 α14; 0 α22 0 0; 0 α32 α33 0; α41 α42 α43 α44]) in v=A-1u. Solid lines are point 
estimates, dotted lines are 95% confidence bands (analytical). Number of lags selected according to standard statistical lag-length criteria.   30







Response of Output Gap to a MP Shock










Response of GDP Defl. Inflation to a MP Shock
















Response of Output Gap to a MP Shock



















Response of FFR to a MP Shock
 
Figure 5. IRFs to a Monetary Policy Shock: Sub-sample Analysis 






























Note: Tri-variate VAR in CBO ouput gap, GDP deflator inflation, and federal funds rate. Identification 
based on the sign restrictions reported in Table 3. Solid lines are point estimates, dotted lines are 95% 
confidence bands. Number of lags selected according to standard statistical lag-length criteria. 
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Figure 6. Inflation Reaction to a Monetary Policy Shock – UK data:  
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Response of CPI INFLATION to a MP Shock
 
Note: Tri-variate VAR in a measure of real activity, a measure of inflation, and the nominal interest rate. The measures of real activity are, left to right: real 
GDP, HP-filtered output, quadratically detrended output and HP-filtered output (all in logs, multiplied by 100). The measure of inflation is the GDP 
deflator for all columns but the last one, which uses the CPI. Identification achieved through a Cholesky (lower triangular) factorization of the variance-
covariance matrix. Solid lines are point estimates, dotted lines are 95% confidence bands (analytical). Number of lags selected according to standard 
statistical lag-length criteria.   32
Figure 7. Impulse Response Functions to a Monetary Policy Shock: 
Structural Model vs. Structural VAR on simulated data - PRIOR 1 
 



















Note: Solid lines represent the Structural model. Dotted lines represent the Structural 
VAR on simulated data. The data generating process is the New-Keynesian model in the 
main text parameterized according to Prior 1 in Table 1. The point estimates of the 
Structural VAR on simulated data are based upon 10,000 repetitions. In each simulated 
sample, 100 extra observations are produced, and then discarded, to get a vector of 
stochastic initial conditions. Identification achieved through a Cholesky (lower 
triangular) factorization of the variance-covariance matrix using the following ordering: 
output gap, inflation and nominal interest rate. Number of lags selected according to 
standard statistical lag length criteria.   33
Figure 8. Impulse Response Functions to a Monetary Policy Shock: 
Structural Model vs. Structural VAR on simulated data - PRIOR 2 
 


















Note: Solid lines represent the Structural model. Dotted lines represent the Structural 
VAR on simulated data. The data generating process is the New-Keynesian model in the 
main text parameterized according to Prior 2 in Table 1. The point estimates of the 
Structural VAR on simulated data are based upon 10,000 repetitions. In each simulated 
sample, 100 extra observations are produced, and then discarded, to get a vector of 
stochastic initial conditions. Identification achieved through a Cholesky (lower 
triangular) factorization of the variance-covariance matrix using the following ordering: 
output gap, inflation and nominal interest rate. Number of lags selected according to 
standard statistical lag length criteria. 
   34
















Output Gap -> MP Shock














Inflation -> MP Shock


















Interest Rate -> MP Shock
Figure 9. Impulse Response Functions to a Monetary Policy Shock: 
Structural Model vs. Structural VAR on simulated data - PRIOR 2 
 
Identification Based on Sign Restrictions 
 






























Output Gap -> MP Shock














Inflation -> MP Shock


















Interest Rate -> MP Shock
 
Panel B: Determinacy
Note: Solid lines represent the Structural model. Dotted lines represent the Structural VAR on simulated 
data. The data generating process is the New-Keynesian model in the main text parameterized 
according to Prior 2 in Table 1. The point estimates of the Structural VAR on simulated data are 
based upon 10,000 repetitions. In each simulated sample, 100 extra observations are produced, and 
then discarded, to get a vector of stochastic initial conditions. Identification based on the sign 
restrictions reported in Table 3. Number of lags selected according to standard statistical lag length 
criteria.   35




































































































































































actual data estimated SVAR
actual data confidence bounds
simulated SVAR under Prior 1
simulated SVAR under Prior 2
Figure 10. Comparison of Estimated and Simulated  















Note: Tri-variate VAR in output gap, inflation rate, and federal funds rate. Solid and dash-dotted lines refer 
to the structural VAR estimated on actual data (mean and 95% analytical confidence bands). Circles and 
stars refer to the structural VAR estimated on simulated data. Identification achieved through a Cholesky 
(lower triangular) factorization of the variance-covariance matrix. Number of lags selected according to 
standard statistical lag-length criteria. 
 
Figure 11. Comparison of Estimated and Simulated  
Impulse Response Function to a Monetary Policy Shock: Model with Habit Formation 
 
Note: Tri-variate VAR in output gap, inflation rate, and federal funds rate. Solid and dash-dotted lines 
refer to the structural VAR estimated on actual data (mean and 95% analytical confidence bands). 
Diamonds refer to the structural VAR estimated on data simulated from a model with habit formation. 
Identification achieved through a Cholesky (lower triangular) factorization of the variance-covariance 
matrix. Number of lags selected according to standard statistical lag-length criteria. 
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Figure 12. Impulse Response Functions to a Monetary Policy Shock: 
The Role of the Omitted Variable under Indeterminacy 
    Contemporaneos Zero restrictions           Sign Restrictions 












point estimate of the SVAR with (Greenbook) expected inflation
5th and 95th percentile from the SVAR with (Greenbook) expected inflation
point estimate of the SVAR without (Greenbook) expected inflation












point estimate of the SVAR with (Greenbook) expected inflation
5th and 95th percentile from the SVAR with (Greenbook) expected inflation




Note: Solid lines represent the Structural model. The point estimates of the Structural VAR on 
simulated data are based upon 10,000 repetitions. In each simulated sample, 100 extra 
observations are produced, and then discarded, to get a vector of stochastic initial conditions. 
Identification achieved through a Cholesky (lower triangular) factorization of the variance-
covariance matrix using the following ordering: expected future inflation, output gap, inflation 
and nominal interest rate. Number of lags selected according to standard statistical lag length 
criteria. 
Figure 13. Comparison of the Inflation Responses to a Monetary Policy 
Shock from Estimated SVARs with and without the Greenbook 
Expected Inflation: pre-Volcker period 
Note: The solid lines with squares at each data point and the dash-dotted lines refer to the 
structural four-variate VAR estimated on actual data (mean, 5th and 95th percentile) which also 
include the one-quarter ahead Greenbook expected inflation. The solid lines refer to the tri-
variate structural VARs estimated on actual data withtout including the Greenbook expected 
inflation. 